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War-Waging in Jeopardy? The Desperation of the US Elite and the Return of Henry Kissinger | The Anglo-American Elite Tries to Stop the Turkish March. In Vain! |
1) weakening and undermining, progressively but surely, Russia,
2) splitting Russia and China
3) neutralizing the influence of Russia in the Middle East
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| >>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1T-62uxbMBM<< |
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| HEINZ KISSINGER & "ON EXCELLENCE" AUTHOR FRITZ KRAMER WHO RAN THE PENTAGON FOR FORTY-FIVE (45) YEARS, TIME FOR CHANGE ALRIGHT |
The Neocons’
ferocious and deranged aggressive policy managed to nullify all three
Kissingerian geostrategic achievements. In a sense, it has been a
fortune for humanity, a proof of the diplomatic ability of Vladimir
Putin and a clear indication of the rapacious stupidity of the
Clinton/Bush establishment. For a profit, they did sell to Russia the
rope to be used to hang them. But now the Anglo-American elite
realizes that the group, the mafia, the establishment to whom they gave
the car keys, have created a situation of existential danger for their
domination. The real economy of the US has been thoroughly weakened by
the escalating financial looting, to the point that also their
war-waging ability has been jeopardized. And the Elite realizes that
Russia and its allies are not going to surrender to the ferocious but
hysterical and ineffective assault conceived by the moronic Neocon war
criminals. This time will not be a fake coward war like the one against
Iraq, or Libya. This time will be a real, nuclear, war. And the
Anglo-American elite is ready to start any war against an enemy unable
to defend itself, while they are scared to death of a real war in which
they could LOOSE.
The recent developments in Turkey has shown, for the first time, that a NATO/US sponsored coup d’état did NOT succeed. Now, Turkey is entering a new political trajectory and a new geostrategic realm. Though it’s difficult to foresee with perfect accuracy what is going to happen, it is clear that a process of progressive disintegration of the anglaomerican control and domination apparatus has started. It could progress very fast and very dramatically. The possibility of Turkey leaving NATO, de jure or simply de facto, is being contemplated by many of the most competent observers. An informal military relation with Russia, China (and Iran!) is already a fact. The notorious US network of influence nominally run by Fetullah Gulen is being dismantled not only in Turkey, but in Azerbaijan and, it is expected to be weakened and neutralized in all the Turkic areas, i.e. the Southern Flank of the ex Soviet Union. These areas were supposed to be the bastion of the “West” against Russia. They are rapidly becoming the opposite.
The Turkish lesson is being studied very carefully by a large number of countries. Starting with the Bulgaria leadership who cowardly preferred an economic suicide when was told by Hillary Clinton’s darling, Victoria Nuland to cancel the gigantic Southern Stream pipeline from Russia. The Turkish lesson is being studied all over the Balkans, the Middle East, North Africa, and of course, Continental Europe. The British Brexit decision, though clearly dictated by clever, realpolitik considerations of surviving “to fight another day,” is part of these lessons learned and probably, was an incentive to the Turkish military and elite to make the Gulen coup fail.
And so the decrepit Kissinger is again presented on the public scene by the elite who hope he can do the “detente” trick again. We seriously doubt that Russia will fall for that for even a second. Despite the many “friends” of Russia who are vociferously telling Putin: Look, look how good is Kissinger. He represents the good faction in the West. Sign a deal with him and everything will be good and fine. Most likely Russia will treat the “messenger boy” with extreme formal respect, will even go to the motion of discussing and negotiating in some form. BUT it will never let its strategy be conditioned by the promise and the good word of the Detente man. There will not be another Gorbachev, there will not a be an Yeltsin. Quite the contrary. Maybe there will not even be a Medvedev in the future of Russia.
Last February 4, Kissinger was in Moscow giving a speech at the Gorchakov Fund explaining why he represented the alternative to a confrontation and presenting his plan to go back to the good old days i.e. when Russia was… royally undermined. See the complete speech to believe (see transcript of speech below).
<http://gorchakovfund.ru/en/news/18352/ >
On Aug 19, The Doctor comes back with the same music in an interview to Jacob Heilbrunn for the National Interest magazine. It is very telling of the uneasy situation the Masters of Kissinger are at this point. <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-interview-henry-kissinger-13615 >
On one side, the old factotum of Wall Street has to say words that, he believes, will be well received in Moscow (criticism of the anti Russia attitude of the Neocons), on the other he cannot by explain frankly that his Detente strategy in the 1970s, and his “nice words” in 2016 have the same purpose: Smash Russia! He is asked: “détente played a critical role in bringing down the Soviet Union, didn’t it?” Kissinger’s answer: “That is my view. We viewed détente as a strategy for conducting the conflict with the Soviet Union.”
See the following exchange:
Heilbrunn: I’d forgotten
that he’d managed that feat. In the end, though, détente played a
critical role in bringing down the Soviet Union, didn’t it?
Kissinger: That is my view. We viewed détente as a strategy for conducting the conflict with the Soviet Union.
Heilbrunn: I’m amazed
that this doesn’t get more attention—in Europe, this is the common view,
that détente was essential toward softening up Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union, and getting over the memory of World War II, whereas in
the United States we have a triumphalist view.
Kissinger: Well, you
have the view that Reagan started the process with his Evil Empire
speech, which, in my opinion, occurred at the point when the Soviet
Union was already well on the way to defeat. We were engaged in a
long-term struggle, generating many competing analyses. I was on the
hard-line side of the analysis. But I stressed also the diplomatic and
psychological dimensions. We needed to wage the Cold War from a posture
in which we would not be isolated, and in which we would have the best
possible basis for conducting unavoidable conflicts. Finally, we had a
special obligation to find a way to avoid nuclear conflict, since that
risked civilization. We sought a position to be ready to use force when
necessary but always in the context of making it clearly demonstrable as
a last resort. The neoconservatives took a more absolutist view. Reagan
used the span of time that was available to him with considerable
tactical skill, although I’m not sure that all of it was preconceived.
But its effect was extremely impressive. I think the détente period was
an indispensable prelude.
Heilbrunn: The other monumental accomplishment was obviously the opening to China. Do you feel today that—
Kissinger: —Reducing the Soviet role in the Middle East. That was not minor.
Heilbrunn: That’s correct, and saving Israel in the ’73 war with the arms supply.
Kissinger: The two were related.
Heilbrunn: Is China the
new Wilhelmine Germany today? Richard Nixon, shortly before he died,
told William Safire that it was necessary to create the opening to
China, but we may have created a Frankenstein.
Kissinger: A country
that has had three thousand years of dominating its region can be said
to have an inherent reality. The alternative would have been to keep
China permanently subdued in collusion with the Soviet Union, and
therefore making the Soviet Union—already an advanced nuclear
country—the dominant country of Eurasia with American connivance. But
China inherently presents a fundamental challenge to American strategy.
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-interview-henry-kissinger-13615
The Interview: Henry Kissinger
See:
http://www.fort-russ.com/2015/08/kissinger-goal-of-us-is-break-up-of.html
Kissinger: The goal of the US is a break up of Russia
See:
http://gorchakovfund.ru/en/news/18352/
Primakov Lecture by Henry A. Kissinger at the Gorchakov Fund in Moscow
ANNEX
Primakov Lecture by Henry A. Kissinger at the Gorchakov Fund in Moscow
February 4, 2016
From 2007
into 2009, Evgeny Primakov and I chaired a group composed of retired
senior ministers, high officials, and military leaders from Russia and
the United States, including some of you present here today. Its purpose
was to ease the adversarial aspects of the U.S.-Russian relationship
and to consider opportunities for cooperative approaches. In America, it
was described as a Track II group, which meant it was bipartisan and
encouraged by the White House to explore but not negotiate on its
behalf. We alternated meetings in each other’s country. President Putin
received the group in Moscow in 2007, and President Medvedev in 2009. In
2008, President George W. Bush assembled most of his National Security
team in the Cabinet Room for a dialogue with our guests.
All the
participants had held responsible positions during the Cold War. During
periods of tension, they had asserted the national interest of their
country as they understood it. But they had also learned through
experience the perils of a technology threatening civilized life and
evolving in a direction which, in crisis, might disrupt any organized
human activity. Upheavals were looming around the globe, magnified in
part by different cultural identities and clashing ideologies. The goal
of the Track II effort was to overcome crises and explore common
principles of world order.
Evgeny
Primakov was an indispensable partner in this effort. His sharp
analytical mind combined with a wide grasp of global trends acquired in
years close to and ultimately at the center of power, and his great
devotion to his country refined our thinking and helped in the quest for
a common vision. We did not always agree, but we always respected each
other. He is missed by all of us and by me personally as a colleague and
a friend.
I do not
need to tell you that our relations today are much worse than they were a
decade ago. Indeed, they are probably the worst they have been since
before the end of the Cold War. Mutual trust has been dissipated on both
sides. Confrontation has replaced cooperation. I know that in his last
months, Evgeny Primakov looked for ways to overcome this disturbing
state of affairs. We would honor his memory by making that effort our
own.
At the
end of the Cold War, both Russians and Americans had a vision of
strategic partnership shaped by their recent experiences. Americans were
expecting that a period of reduced tensions would lead to productive
cooperation on global issues. Russian pride in their role in modernizing
their society was tempered by discomfort at the transformation of their
borders and recognition of the monumental tasks ahead in reconstruction
and redefinition. Many on both sides understood that the fates of
Russia and the U.S. remained tightly intertwined. Maintaining strategic
stability and preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction
became a growing necessity, as did the building of a security system for
Eurasia, especially along Russia’s long periphery. New vistas opened up
in trade and investment; cooperation in the field of energy topped the
list.
Regrettably,
the momentum of global upheaval has outstripped the capacities of
statesmanship. Evgeny Primakov’s decision as Prime Minister, on a flight
over the Atlantic to Washington, to order his plane to turn around and
return to Moscow to protest the start of NATO military operations in
Yugoslavia was symbolic. The initial hopes that the close cooperation in
the early phases of the campaign against al-Qaida and the Taliban in
Afghanistan might lead to partnership on a broader range of issues
weakened in the vortex of disputes over Middle East policy, and then
collapsed with the Russian military moves in the Caucasus in 2008 and
Ukraine in 2014. The more recent efforts to find common ground in the
Syria conflict and to defuse the tension over Ukraine have done little
to change the mounting sense of estrangement.
The
prevailing narrative in each country places full blame on the other
side, and in each country there is a tendency to demonize, if not the
other country, then its leaders. As national security issues dominate
the dialogue, some of the mistrust and suspicions from the bitter
Cold-War struggle have reemerged. These feelings have been exacerbated
in Russia by the memory of the first post-Soviet decade when Russia
suffered a staggering socio-economic and political crisis, while the
United States enjoyed its longest period of uninterrupted economic
expansion. All this caused policy differences over the Balkans, the
former Soviet territory, the Middle East, NATO expansion, missile
defense, and arms sales to overwhelm prospects for cooperation.
Perhaps
most important has been a fundamental gap in historical conception. For
the United States, the end of the Cold War seemed like a vindication of
its traditional faith in inevitable democratic revolution. It visualized
the expansion of an international system governed by essentially legal
rules. But Russia’s historical experience is more complicated. To a
country across which foreign armies have marched for centuries from both
East and West, security will always need to have a geopolitical, as
well as a legal, foundation. When its security border moves from the
Elbe 1,000 miles east towards Moscow, Russia’s perception of world order
will contain an inevitable strategic component. The challenge of our
period is to merge the two perspectives—the legal and the
geopolitical—in a coherent concept.
In this
way, paradoxically, we find ourselves confronting anew an essentially
philosophical problem. How does the United States work together with
Russia, a country which does not share all its values but is an
indispensable component of the international order? How does Russia
exercise its security interests without raising alarms around its
periphery and accumulating adversaries? Can Russia gain a respected
place in global affairs with which the United States is comfortable? Can
the United States pursue its values without being perceived as
threatening to impose them? I will not attempt to propose answers to all
these questions. My purpose is to encourage an effort to explore them.
Many
commentators, both Russian and American, have rejected the possibility
of the U.S. and Russia working cooperatively on a new international
order. In their view, the United States and Russia have entered a new
Cold War.
The
danger today is less a return to military confrontation than the
consolidation of a self-fulfilling prophecy in both countries. The
long-term interests of both countries call for a world that transforms
the contemporary turbulence and flux into a new equilibrium which is
increasingly multipolar and globalized.
The
nature of the turmoil is in itself unprecedented. Until quite recently,
global international threats were identified with the accumulation of
power by a dominating state. Today threats more frequently arise from
the disintegration of state power and the growing number of ungoverned
territories. This spreading power vacuum cannot be dealt with by any
state, no matter how powerful on an exclusively national basis. It
requires sustained cooperation between the United States and Russia, and
other major powers. Therefore the elements of competition, in dealing
with the traditional conflicts in the interstate system, must be
constrained so that the competition remains within bounds and creates
conditions which prevent a recurrence.
There
are, as we know, a number of divisive issues before us, Ukraine or Syria
as the most immediate. For the past few years, our countries have
engaged in episodic discussions of such matters without much notable
progress. This is not surprising, because the discussions have taken
place outside an agreed strategic framework. Each of the specific issues
is an expression of a larger strategic one. Ukraine needs to be
embedded in the structure of European and international security
architecture in such a way that it serves as a bridge between Russia and
the West, rather than as an outpost of either side. Regarding Syria, it
is clear that the local and regional factions cannot find a solution on
their own. Compatible U.S.-Russian efforts coordinated with other major
powers could create a pattern for peaceful solutions in the Middle East
and perhaps elsewhere.
Any
effort to improve relations must include a dialogue about the emerging
world order. What are the trends that are eroding the old order and
shaping the new one? What challenges do the changes pose to both Russian
and American national interests? What role does each country want to
play in shaping that order, and what position can it reasonably and
ultimately hope to occupy in that new order? How do we reconcile the
very different concepts of world order that have evolved in Russia and
the United States—and in other major powers—on the basis of historical
experience? The goal should be to develop a strategic concept for
U.S.-Russian relations within which the points of contention may be
managed.
In the
1960′s and 1970′s, I perceived international relations as an essentially
adversarial relationship between the United States and the Soviet
Union. With the evolution of technology, a conception of strategic
stability developed that the two countries could implement, even as
their rivalry continued in other areas. The world has changed
dramatically since then. In particular, in the emerging multipolar
order, Russia should be perceived as an essential element of any new
global equilibrium, not primarily as a threat to the United States.
I have
spent the greater part of the past seventy years engaged in one way or
another in U.S.-Russian relations. I have been at decision centers when
alert levels have been raised, and at joint celebrations of diplomatic
achievement. Our countries and the peoples of the world need a more
durable prospect.
I am here
to argue for the possibility of a dialogue that seeks to merge our
futures rather than elaborate our conflicts. This requires respect by
both sides of the vital values and interest of the other. These goals
cannot be completed in what remains of the current administration. But
neither should their pursuits be postponed for American domestic
politics. It will only come with a willingness in both Washington and
Moscow, in the White House and the Kremlin, to move beyond the
grievances and sense of victimization to confront the larger challenges
that face both of our countries in the years ahead.
KISSINGER, HEINZ AND THE SERIAL KILLING MACHINE KNOWN AS MASS MURDERERS DOING GLOBAL WAR
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