Antonin Scalia on Corporations~ Supreme Court Justice (nominated by Pres. Reagan 1986 ~Sovereign immunity only applies to foreign-owned companies
... Justice Scalia joined the Court's decision on DOLE FOOD v. PATRICKSON on Apr 22, 2003: In 1997, a group of Central American farm workers alleged injury from chemical exposure against Dole Food Company and the Dead Sea Companies, which produced dibromochloropropane, an agricultural pesticide that harmed the farm workers. Dole argued that the Dead Sea Companies were instrumentalities of a foreign state, Israel, as defined by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) and thus entitled to immunity.
CONCURRENCE IN PART and DISSENT IN PART: By Breyer; joined by O'Connor ... The phrase "owned by a foreign state" covers a foreign state's legal interest in a corporate subsidiary, where that interest consists of the foreign state's ownership of a corporate parent that owns the shares of the subsidiary.
The relevant foreign nation does not DIRECTLY own a
majority of the corporate subsidiaries' shares. But (simplifying the
facts) it does own a corporate parent, which, in turn, owns the
corporate subsidiaries' shares. Does this type of majority-ownership
interest count as an example of what the statute calls an "other
ownership interest"? The Court says no. I disagree.
Source: Supreme Court case 03-DOLE argued on Jan 22, 2003,
HELD: Delivered by Kennedy; joined by Rehnquist, Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg,
The Court held, 7-2, that a foreign state must itself own a majority of the shares of a corporation if the corporation is to be deemed an instrumentality of the state under the provisions of the FSIA. The corporate structure ("tiering") in this particular case prevented the Dead Sea Companies from claiming instrumentality status.
Can only sue for direct results of corporate negligence ...
.. Justice Scalia joined the dissent on CSX TRANSPORTATION v. MCBRIDE on Jun 23, 2011: A railroad employee complained that the configuration of locomotives he had been assigned was unsafe because it required excessive use of an independent handbrake. Told to run the configuration as it was, the engineer after 10 hours of work injured his hand while using the handbrake. He never recovered full use of his hand and sued the railroad under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA).
HELD: Proximate cause not needed in railroad employee injury suitDelivered by Ginsburg; joined by Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan & Thomas
Recognizing
the hazards of railroading, Congress enacted FELA in 1910. It allowed
injured employees to recover "for injury resulting from negligence" of
the railroad. By using this language, Congress intended to substitute
for common law "proximate cause" a standard that any negligence by the
railroad, however slight, that caused injury to an employee would lead
to railroad liability for the injury.
Congress dispensed with examination of whether the railroad's negligence
was the "direct" or "probable" cause of the injury. If any injury is
forseeable, and the railroad negligent in preventing it, FELA allowed
damages even if the particular injury is not forseeable. FELA's wording,
Supreme Court precedent, and 50 years of Court of Appeals decisions
following this precedent lead to this conclusion.
DISSENT: Congress did not disavow proximate cause in worker RR suitsFiled by Roberts; joined by Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito
Proximate
cause has long been a requirement in tort law. When enacting FELA,
Congress expressly disavowed four other common law standards of tort
law; The Court therefore has no basis to find that Congress intended to
do away with proximate cause in FELA cases by implication. The Court
misinterprets the Court's precedent and provides a standard for FELA
cases lacking in guidance to courts and allowing unpredictable
recoveries.
Source: Supreme Court case 11-MCBRIDE argued on Mar 28, 2011
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| Other Justices on Corporations: | Antonin Scalia on other issues: |
economist/blogs/voting-rights-act Antonin Scalia’s uber-activism<Click
COMMENTS: This article reflects a common misconception regarding the Voting Rights Act, that it covers "states." Actually, it covers jurisdictions/ voting districts where minority voting registration is less than 50%. It just so happens that in several Southern States, the minority voting registration is less than 50% in every single jurisdiction, such that the entire state is covered. But it also applies to many northern jurisdictions, including Manhattan. Any jurisdiction can exempt itself from the Act's provisions by showing it has successfully grown minority voting registration above the threshold. Therefore the Chief Justice's premises are totally, totally incorrect.
EXTOLLING CORPORATION(S):
... Having formed the City Financial Corp. and the B. K. Marcus-Saul Singer Syndicate for the purpose of speculating in the stock of that corporation, Marcus & Singer were free early in 1928 to turn their attention to even bigger deals. In February, 1928, the directors of the Central Mercantile Bank woke up to find that the stock of their bank was going up in price. In six weeks the price zoomed from $175 to $415 a share. A man named Levenson, they found, was quietly buying shares of the Central Mercantile Bank for the Bank of U.S. under the direction of Marcus & Singer. The directors of the Central Mercantile Bank decided that their president C. Stanley Mitchell should visit the Bank of U.S. and find out why it was buying Central Mercantile Bank stock. Marcus & Singer told Mitchell that they intended to absorb his bank ....
Biggest Bank Failure . . . in U.S. history was the $240,000,000 collapse of the Bank of U.S. Here the detailed narrative of the financial legerdemain with which two men created that egregious structure. New banks for old, fifty-seven branches, a skyline full of real estate, and a Napoleonic complex.
scribdFortune-Magazine-1933-Cast-of-Characters-Five-Jews-and-one-Gentile-played-the-chief-roles-in-the-tragic-comedy-of-the-Bank-of-U-S By M. R. Werner<Click
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