Nikolas K. Gvosdev December 21, 2013
Whether the missiles are there (the German newspaper Bild claims to have satellite imagery showing the systems already in place) or whether Russia has not yet finalized its plans, should the United States be concerned about even the possibility that Iskanders would be deployed and activated in Kaliningrad?
The Iskander has a range of approximately 310 miles and was designed to be a more accurate replacement for the older and less reliable Soviet-era SCUD rocket. The Iskander system is meant to be able to deliver precision, pinpoint strikes on targets. It is a hypersonic rocket (traveling over Mach 5) and is considered to be highly maneuverable in flight in order to evade defensive counter-measures; it can also be retargeted after launch if it is tracking a moving target. The Iskander can be fitted with a variety of conventional or tactical nuclear warheads depending on the mission; it can be used to disrupt communications, destroy bunkers or target ground units.
If deployed and activated in the Kaliningrad region, Iskanders would be able to strike targets in the new NATO members of Poland and the Baltic States, including the locations that have been set aside as the permanent land-based components of a U.S. theater ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in Europe—the radar systems as well as ground-based interceptors (although, at present, U.S. plans to site more advanced SM-3 IIB rockets in Poland within a decade have been put on hold) Significantly, Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad pose no threat to the territories of Russia's traditional European partners further West, notably Germany. That, along with Putin's additional comments about U.S. tactical nuclear weapons still resident in Europe that are "uncontrolled" by Europeans, may indicate that Moscow wants to reframe the issue away from "Russia versus the West" into a narrative which would get "old Europe" to question the value and utility of having the new NATO members and the United States take steps which aggravate relations with Russia.
Indeed, Russia has regularly threatened to install the Iskanders should the United States and its NATO partners proceed with the development of a theater BMD system; one of the most memorable was when former president Dmitry Medvedev declared that Iskanders would be deployed one day after the November 2008 election of Barack Obama. But, in the past, Russia never followed through on these pronouncements, due to concerns that this might create problems in its relations with the West. So what might have changed the Russian calculations?
First, the reset is over. In the past, Russian restraint in not deploying this potent weapons system in an enclave surrounded by NATO members was expected to produce reciprocal gestures, and initially, Moscow interpreted the Obama administration's decision in September 2009 to cancel the Bush-era BMD program as a sign of conciliation. But the Obama team moved to retool, rather than scrap, the Bush plans.